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Abstract
In this chapter, we present flow-based network traffic monitoring of large
scale networks. Continuous Internet traffic increase requires a deployment
of advanced monitoring techniques to provide near real-time and long-term
network visibility. Collected flow data can be further used for network be-
havioral analysis to indicate legitimate and malicious traffic, proving cyber
threats, etc. An early warning system should integrate flow-based monitor-
ing to ensure network situational awareness.
1 Introduction
Detailed traffic statistics are necessary to provide a permanent network situational
awareness. Such statistics can be complete packet traces, flow statistics or volume
statistics. A trade-off must be chosen between computational feasibility and pro-
vided level of information to efficiently handle high-speed traffic in large scale
networks.
• Full packet traces traditionally used by traffic analyzers provide most detailed
information. On the other hand the scalability and processing feasibility for
permanent traffic observation and storing in high-speed networks is an issue
including high operational costs.
• Flow statistics provide information from Internet Protocol (IP) headers.
They do not include any payload information, however we still know from
IP point of view who communicates with whom, which time, etc. Such ap-
proach can reduce up to 1000 times the amount of data necessary to process
and store. Using flow we are able even to monitor encrypted traffic.
1
• Volume statistics are often easy to obtain in form of Simple Network Man-
agement Protocol (SNMP) data. They provide less detailed network view
in comparison with flow statistics or full packet traces and do not allow
advanced traffic analysis.
We use flow data for their scalability and ability to provide a sufficient amount
of information. Flow-based monitoring allows us to permanently observe both
small end-user networks and large National Research and Education Network
(NREN) backbone links.
2 Flow-Based Monitoring
Measurement of IP flow statistics was first introduced by Cisco Systems [2] in
1996. NetFlow protocol introduced de facto standard for today’s flow monitoring.
NetFlow is used to export flow information from so called exporter to collector.
The flow is defined as a sequence of consecutive packets with the same IP addresses,
ports and protocol number.
NetFlow is traditionally used for routing optimization, application troubleshoot-
ing, traffic mix monitoring, accounting and billing, and others. Besides these
running-up applications new utilization attracts the attention including detection
of security incidents and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, already embedded in
some collectors. Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) is an alternative flow-based
approach to traditional pattern matching to detect cyber threats, e.g. Advanced
Persistent Threats (APT).
2.1 Definition of IP Flow
In general, flows are a set of packets which share a common property. The most
important such properties are the flow’s endpoints. The simplest type of flow
is a 5-tuple, with all its packets having the same source IP address, destination
IP address, port numbers, and protocol (see Figure 1). Flows are unidirectional
and all their packets travel in the same direction. The flow begins when its first
packet is observed. The flow ends when no new traffic for existing flow is observed
(inactive timeout) or connection terminates (e.g. TCP connection is closed). An
active timeout is time period after which data about an ongoing flow are exported.
Statistics on IP traffic flows provide information about who communicates with
whom, when, how long, using what protocol and service and also how much data
was transferred.
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SRC and DST IP addr
SRC and DSTport
Protocol number
Lifetime
Number of packets
Sum of bytes
TCP flags
Others
HTTP Request
FROM 172.16.96.48:15094
TO 209.85.135.147:80
HTTP Response
FROM 209.85.135.147:80
TO 172.16.96.48:15094
Flow start Duration Proto Src IP Addr:Port Dst IP Addr:Port Flags Packets Bytes
09:41:21.763 0.101 TCP 172.16.96.48:15094 -> 209.85.135.147:80 AP.SF 4 715
09:41:21.893 0.031 TCP 209.85.135.147:80 -> 172.16.96.48:15094 AP.SF 4 1594
Figure 1: The IP flow statistics describing endpoints communication.
3 Flow Exporters
NetFlow can be enabled on routers which constitute primary source of NetFlow
data today. On the other hand utilization of standalone dedicated systems such as
dedicated probes seems to have several benefits. Oﬄoading of resource intensive
flow measurement to dedicated probe is probably the most important one. When
NetFlow is enabled the routers often suffer of huge system load. Dedicated probe
allows routers to perform their primary task, i.e. to route packets and keep mission
critical applications up and running. A wide variety of network devices are capable
of generating flow. We mention three basic categories of flow exporters:
• Routers, switches, and firewalls observe all traffic going through the network.
They are in a unique position to generate detailed flow data. However, in
some environments (e.g. on high-speed backbones) they are not able to
process all packets. So sampled NetFlow was introduced by Cisco. When
sampling is used only one packet out of n is processed. The flow data are less
accurate and a further flow processing can be affected e.g. sampling effect
on anomaly detection methods.
Many vendors provide an equivalent to Cisco NetFlow technology on their
devices, however some of them use a different name for it, e.g. jflow, clowd,
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NetStream. The flow support is implemented in software (lower performance,
sampling required) or in dedicated hardware (high performance, some flow
elements may be missing e.g. TCP flags).
• Dedicated flow probes were developed to overcome limitations (costs, avail-
ability, and functionality) of router based flow exporters. The most well
known exporters include nProbe, yaf, and FlowMon. They are typically im-
plemented as open-source software (Linux, BSD) using commodity hardware
(server, network interface cards). The probes use kernel TCP stack bypass to
process more traffic in comparison to standard Packet Capture (PCAP) in-
terface. Further the Receive-Side Scaling (RSS) is used to distribute network
traffic to multiple cores. To achieve line-rate processing the hardware accel-
eration is used. There are special Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
based cards.
Test Access Port (TAP) devices or Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN) ports
must be used to provide input for probes. TAP devices are non-obtrusive
and are not detectable on the network. They send a copy (1:1) of all network
packets to a probe. In case of failure the TAP has built-in fail-over mode. The
observed line will not be interrupted and will stay operational independent
on any potential probe failure.
In case of SPAN, we must enable the port mirroring functionality on a
router/switch side to forward network traffic to monitoring device. How-
ever, we must take in count some SPAN port limits. Detailed comparison
between using TAP devices or SPAN ports is described in [9].
• Virtual flow probes are special case of dedicated probes. They are used in
virtualized environments, to monitor the traffic passing through a virtual
switch or a virtual TAP. They are available as a virtual appliance.
3.1 Flow Export Formats
Several NetFlow versions were introduced by Cisco. The most common are version
5 and version 9. NetFlow version 5 uses fix data format and is restricted to IPv4
flows. NetFlow version 9 [4] introduced templates to describe flow data. Version
9 supports IPv6, MPLS, VLANS, and MAC addresses.
NetFlow version 9 was the basis for Internet Protocol Flow Information eXport
(IPFIX) [5]. IPFIX is developed and promoted by Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It provides a standard for IP flow information from routers, probes, and
other devices. There is still (as of 2012) low IPFIX support, especially advanced
IPFIX functions are missing. Most implementations support only NetFlow version
9 subset in IPFIX protocol.
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3.2 Flow Application Extensions
Flow data provide information from data link layer (L2), network layer (L3), and
transport layer (L4) of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. It is no longer
possible to rely on port numbers to identify applications. Typically HTTP traffic
(TCP port 80) can pass through most firewalls and presents a way how to tunnel
data. HTTP became the new Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and a traffic
passing over HTTP must be inspected.
The application visibility is crucial to prevent all kind of unwanted traffic.
IPFIX provides Enterprise Information Elements to store application layer (L7)
information. AppFlow [3] is an example how to describe the actual applications
in use within the flow. Similar functionality provides Cisco NBAR with Flexible
NetFlow, Palo Alto firewalls, and other application-aware flow exporters.
4 Flow Collectors
IP flow generation represents first important step to be able to monitor a large
scale network. Once we are able to export flow data from the particular metering
points in the network, next step is to collect it, store it and provide suitable tools
for further flow data analysis. In this part, we present current approaches to
storing IP flow data and discuss frequently used operations needed during data
analysis.
4.1 Flow Collectors in General
The main role of collector is to store flow data for prospective further analysis.
Beside this, there is a couple of other features and roles, which should be im-
plemented at the collector side to provide full support for network administrator
work, including further manipulation with the data like flow listing, flow filtering,
flow aggregation and also support for automatic flow data analysis.
There is a large number of existing collectors available to install and deploy.
We can choose either commercial solution with full technical support or decide
to use open-source project with technical support usually provided by collector
community. There are a number of open-source collectors with wide spectrum of
features, large user community and active development. We suggest choosing some
of these open-source projects. In the following, we will illustrate collector features
on the NetFlow Sensor (NfSen) example [7], used in our backbone and campus
network.
The main challenge collectors are facing to, is a storing and processing of a large
amount of IP flows. With the increasing speeds of modern computer networks,
this amount is growing up and the requirements for data storage are demanding.
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Five minutes of IP flow data from the backbone 10 Gbps link with halfway load
represents e.g., five billions of flows to store. Therefore we are not able to store
full IP flow data in long term history and we need to replace the old data with
a new one after, e.g., a couple of months. There are several ways how to reduce
the amount of flows, but all these approaches (sampling, data aggregation) led to
losing some amount of information contained in full flow data.
To be able to cope with this huge amount of flow data, the collector has to
have an effective data storage back-end. The manipulation with the stored flow
data should provide fast methods how to search/filter flow data and these tasks
become nontrivial with the huge amounts of flows. We can see basically two types
of data storage for flow data:
• Relation database (SQL) approach – advantages of this approach are well-
known database mechanisms with full support for querying, searching, and
indexing. Contrary to this support, this type of databases was not designed
to work with such huge amounts of data. If we use this solution in back-
bone network, we will face non-trivial problems with the size of database,
huge times needed for database reorganization, querying, making indexes, in-
tegrity, etc. Therefore this type of flow data storing is suitable for the smaller
networks.
• Flat file approach – in this case, the IP flow data are stored in files and
dumped directly to the disk. This approach is suitable for storing large
amounts of flow data. It does not need any further maintenance and does
not consume too much processing power. On the other hand, we need to
access such data sequentially and there are usually no indexes and metadata
over such files. However in the case of flow collection from large networks,
this approach represents more effective approach compared to SQL approach
(see [8]).
Supported format of exported flow data differ in various collectors. We can see
support of NetFlow version 5 and also NetFlow version 9 in majority of collectors.
However, there are sometime problems with full support of template mechanism
used by NetFlow v9. As discussed in Section 3.1 on page 4, the IPFIX format will
substitute current NetFlow v5/v9 formats, but its support in currently used flow
collectors is problematic due to the large possibilities of IPFIX format extendabil-
ity.
4.2 Processing Data with Flow Collector
In the following, we describe the most frequent operations performed with flow
data at the collector side by network administrator. We identify a number of
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standard tasks performed with flow data and illustrate them on the example of
NfSen collector.
Data Storage and Redistribution
The first step performed by each collector is to acquire flow data from the network
and consequent storing to the disk. Depending on the type of data storage system,
there could be performed further data reorganization, redistribution, etc. In the
case of NfSen collector, we can define a various parameters, e.g., where to store
data, how long should be time window for storing data and where to replicate
an identical copy of flow data acquired from network. Also we can define, what
extensions to NetFlow v9 we want to store, e.g., VLAN IDs, AS numbers, MAC
addresses, etc.
Command Line Interface
Once we have stored flow data from the network at the collector side, we need
to perform its analysis. For this purpose, collectors have command line interface
(CLI), web front-end or both, providing the access to the flow data. Typically, we
need to perform one or more of the following actions:
• List flows – we need to see flows itself, with all information stored inside
them. A possibility to define output format of flows – which fields from flow
we want to list – would help in the flow analysis. NfSen collector supports
CLI flow analysis with fully configurable output format.
• Filter flows – filtering is used very often to find out particular IP addresses
or communication in the network. For this case, the collectors have defined
filtering syntax, which should provide a possibility to filter out flows satisfy-
ing various conditions, or in the case of SQL collectors, we use SQL queries.
NfSen collector provides syntax similar to Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) with
various filtering possibilities. Also the time needed to obtain corresponding
flows is crucial for efficient work with collector.
• Flow aggregation – possibility to aggregate flows by various fields is used
often to obtain overview of the network traffic in monitoring network (e.g.,
aggregation by ports, subnets/IP addresses, protocols, etc.).
• Top talkers – this function provide a quick overview of the most active hosts
in network and can be used for revealing possible attackers/victims.
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Web Interface
Although CLI provides detailed access to the flow data, it does not contain any
graphical representation of the data. Therefore, collectors usually dispose with
graphical front-end, representing network traffic in the form of graphs. Network
administrator is able to see any outages or discrepancies in the observed network
easily in the graphs, compared to the CLI.
In case of NfSen collector, there is a variety of graphs representing flow data
from different views (by protocols and for different time periods) and also it pro-
vides direct access through the web interface to the flow data. Therefore, once
network administrator identifies a network problem in the graph, she can directly
list flows corresponding to this issue and perform further analysis.
Beside the standard set of graphs, NfSen collector provides also a possibility
to define profiles. Profiles are defined by the flow data sources and filters applied
to them. As a result, corresponding data matching the filter are stored separately
and new graphs are generated. Using this feature, we are able to define profiles
for e.g., various services or types of traffic (HTTP, DNS, routing data, etc.) in the
network and we can inspect it separately.
Automatic Flow Data Processing
Beside the basic flow data storing and listing/displaying/filtering, the collectors
provide tools for automatic flow data processing. Therefore, network administrator
doesn’t have to check manually all the data, but he can define various conditions
or use automatic analysis methods to inspect current flow data and in the case of
some attack or discrepancy, an alarm can be triggered automatically.
NfSen collector provides alerting tool, with the possibility to define various
conditions and also consequent actions (sending email, starting particular plugin).
Therefore, the network operator can be noticed automatically about, e.g. network
outages.
Extension Possibilities
Although flow collectors have a lot of functionality integrated inside, we need to
perform some customized post processing of flow data often. For this reason, the
extension interface providing standardized access to the flow data can be used with
advantage. NfSen collector provides well defined interface for adding new plugins,
which are able to analyse flow data stored by collector, perform further processing
and also display results through the standard collector web interface.
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5 Monitoring Use Cases
In this part, we describe two large scale networks (i) campus network of Masaryk
University and (ii) the backbone network of CESNET [1]. We show differences
between these two networks, consisting mainly in the type of a monitored traffic.
In the case of campus network, we monitor the traffic ending or originating inside
the network. In the case of backbone network, we are monitoring transit traffic
going through the network. Due to these differences, we would also obtain different
flow data and we should deploy different configurations of flow monitoring system.
5.1 Campus Network
In this scenario, we show campus network containing about 15 000 networked
hosts. The Internet connection is realized through two 10 Gbps links. One part of
traffic does not leave the campus network itself, because it is targeted to the other
hosts inside the network. Other part is incoming and outgoing traffic routed to
CESNET (public Internet).
Internet
Faculty
A
Faculty
B
Faculty
C
Faculty
D
Faculty
E
Campus
Network
Firewall
FlowMon Probe FlowMon Probe
SPAN SPAN
TAP
FlowMon Probe
Figure 2: Flow probes deployment in the campus network.
Figure 2 illustrates possible deployment of flow probes in the campus network.
One probe is deployed to monitor traffic at the border of the campus network.
Analysing this type of traffic, we are able to disclose e.g., security incidents and
attacks against campus network and also malicious traffic and attacks going from
campus network to the Internet. We used flow analysis to reveal previously un-
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known Chuck Norris botnet [6] attacking poorly configured embedded devices (see
Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Unique attackers and attacks on TCP port 23 in the campus network.
Further the probes are deployed between particular campus faculties, moni-
toring the traffic generated inside the network and transferred among the campus
hosts. Analysing this type of traffic, we are able to observe amount of traffic trans-
ferred between particular parts of campus, the load of network links in campus
networks and also security incidents inside the campus network.
The list of situations monitored by network administrators includes: security
incidents, state of particular network services, network load at the particular parts
of campus network, user statistics and accounting, etc.
5.2 Backbone Network
The second scenario demonstrates the large backbone network of CESNET inter-
connecting academic and research institutions in Czech Republic. The majority
of network traffic is transit traffic, going through the backbone network to other
destination and not ending here.
Figure 4 illustrates a deployment of dedicated flow probes (FlowMon) in this
type of network. We deploy flow probes connected via TAP devices at all 10 Gbps
links providing connection to foreign countries and one probe inside the backbone
network. Therefore we are able to inspect both the traffic incoming and outgoing
from the foreign networks and also traffic originating in the domestic networks.
Analysis of backbone data is focused on different aspects. In this case, we
are interested in the amounts of the network traffic transferred between particular
networks and to/from foreign countries. Also the monitoring of link outages and
routing traffic could help network administrators. The monitoring of large scale
security incidents is important too.
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Figure 4: Map of the Czech Republic with the FlowMon probes deployment in the
CESNET’s backbone network. Probes are monitoring international 10 Gbps links.
Figure 5 represents one week traffic observed at SANET link to Slovakia. We
monitor both traffic directions (from abroad to backbone network and vice versa).
There are remarkable diurnal and weekly patterns - lower traffic on weekend and
the maximum load of network during Wednesday and Thursday.
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Figure 5: Diurnal traffic pattern and four security incidents in the SANET 10 Gbps
link interconnecting Czech Republic and Slovakia – time window April 23-30, 2012.
Besides the diurnal and weekly patterns, we can observe four massive security
incidents at the Figure 5. First one represents massive DoS attack (UDP flood
consisting of 6.3 M flows) launched from Slovakia against a university in the Czech
Republic. Next attack is a large distributed DoS (DDoS) attack against public web
hosting provider consisting of 2.9 M attacker flows. Two another serious security
issues follow – massive SSH scans consisting of 4.3 M and 1.9 M flows originating
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at Slovakia high school and targeting more than 5 M possible victims worldwide.
Although these massive incidents are easily detectable, majority of network attacks
and malicious activities are not so intensive and therefore we need to perform
advanced analysis of flow data to be able to reveal them.
6 Summary
This chapter gave an overview about flow monitoring in large scale networks. We
described flow exporters, data export formats, and flow collectors. Two use cases
showed today’s deployment of flow-based monitoring in campus and backbone
network. We also showed flow data of botnet malicious activity and various attacks
at international backbone link.
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